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Abstract 
This master thesis has developed methods for how to interpret failure data 
and incorporate these into OIA's existing database. This also gave input to improvement of 
OIA's existing software Kamfer to develop more functionality to be able to document the work 
process of adding failure data to the existing Generic Maintenance Concepts. Further, this 
master thesis identified areas in the Oceaneering Asset Integrity (OAI)'s existing methodology 
that can be improved to be in compliance with regulatory requirements for establishing a 
preventive maintenance program. 
The research was directed towards regulatory requirement for the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, and any standards or writings with regards to FMEA/RCM processes and failure data. 
Pitfalls with regards to FMEA/RCM and failure data is that these areas of study are mainly for 
design of equipment and corporate risk assessments, so some interpretations has been done to 
be consistent both with regards to FMEA/RCM methodology and OIA's existing methodology.  
Formulas for calculating failure rates from the Oreda failure data has been developed as part of 
the study. 
Suggestions for optimizing a PM program based on historical data are also included. 
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Abbreviations 
The abbreviations used throughout this report are listed below: 
 
CMMS Computerized maintenance management systems 
GMC Generic Maintenance Concept  
HSE  Health, Safety and Environment 
MTTF Mean Time To Failure 
OAI Oceaneering Asset Integrity 
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation diagram 
PM Preventive Maintenance 
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
RCM Reliability Centred Maintenance 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Oceaneering Asset Integrity (OAI) has built Preventive Maintenance Programs for the oil and 
gas industry since the 90`s. 
In that period OAI has built up a database of generic maintenance concepts based on the 
various companies’ best practice.  The initial maintenance activities were based on failure 
modes. But with no new input or maintenance of the database, the failure modes disappeared 
from the maintenance strategies and are now mainly based on vendor maintenance manuals 
and maintenance experience.  
After the new NORSOK Z-008 was issued, June 2011, the PSA focuses more on failure modes, 
cause and mechanism to determine the Preventive Maintenance activities.   
As a response OAI started an internal project to implement failure modes as a module in OAI s 
new software KAMFER 7 which is under development. The failure mode module should be 
added to the new OAI Standard Generic Maintenance Concepts which were meant to contain 
the best maintenance practice from the different project data bases in KAMFER. After in initial 
phase where the building blocks were settled in terms of terminology and wanted structure, 
parts of the project were given as a master thesis. These parts were linked to finding a source of 
failure mode data and developing a methodology to establish Mean Time to Failure for the 
failure modes.  
The OREDA Reliability Data Handbook has been chosen to serve as the fundament for the 
failure modes because of OREDAS generic approach and since it is the most reliable/only 
collection of failure data available. With supplement from other sources over time, the generic 
maintenance strategies will be in compliance with the PSA regulations. 
The OREDA Reliability Data Handbook has previously been used by OAI to perform RAM 
analysis.  But for maintenance purposes the data will not give any MTTF that can be basis for 
maintenance intervals without interpretation, since the MTTF becomes too high. 
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1.2 Objective 
The main scope of the master thesis is to develop a method/work process for how to add/how 
to implement failure modes with corresponding Mean Time to Failure into the Oceaneering 
Generic Maintenance Concepts. 
Oreda Reliability Handbook 5th edition, 2009 will be used as a basis for failure modes and MTTF. 
A methodology for interpretation the failure into MTTF for preventive maintenance purposes 
has to be made.  This work will include investigation of different possibilities to interpret the 
data. Subsequently the different suggestions for failure modes in question will be compared 
with vendor FMECA’s and existing intervals for maintenance activities from different 
Oceaneering databases.  
Also a review of the OAI methodology against the PSA regulations RCM methodology shall be 
included to reveal eventual gaps. 
Additionally the thesis will give input to the structure of OAIs software tool, Kamfer 7 to link the 
failure modes to activities and illustrate the results in the maintenance strategy report or 
FMECA. 
Finally the thesis will give input to how OAI can expand its products to maintenance 
optimization of based on the future failure mode database.   
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1.3 Limitations 
The Thesis does not go into barriers to a large extent since this subject was covered by a 
Master`s thesis last year.  
Additionally OAIs methodology for Technical Hierarchy and Consequence Classification is 
mentioned but has not been analysed since a study already has been performed. 
Initial age exploration is detected as a deviation between the RCM methodology and NORSOK 
Z-008 and thus the OAI methodology. The subject is not considered in the thesis. 
1.4 Accuracy of Estimates 
When calculating the MTTF from the Oreda reliability Handbook several assumptions have been 
made. All of them will have inaccuracies in them. 
The assumption Failure rate a sum of severities, list an incipient failure as a fault. This is not 
correct according to RCM methodology stated in section 2.2.1 but has been made to determine 
a more correct maintenance interval. 
The assumption Usage of upper failure rate to determine MTTF is a coarse assumption and will 
in many cases lead to overkill in terms of a low MTTF. This is done due to the face that Oreda 
data delivers failure rates from equipment with maintenance activities performed on them. The 
failure rate with no equipment is assumed to me much higher than with run to failure. 
Reference data is only based on a three year old failure mode project performed by OAI and 
Statoil. This is not sufficient as a good reference to the calculations. But with lack of FMECAs 
from vendors the failure mode project was the best source available. 
Calculation examples do not contain calculation per failure object. This is due to the reference 
data did not contain calculation at that level.  The calculation examples main purpose is to show 
the results of different assumptions on severity and mean or upper value.  
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2 Short description of Reliability Centred Maintenance 
2.1 Definition of RCM 
Two typical scenarios are common in a maintenance perspective [1]: 
• The plant or installations equipment break down more frequent than expected and thus 
lead to backlog on preventive Maintenance activities. 
• Scheduled inspections only find nothing wrong with the equipment. Thus the equipment 
has been needlessly dismantled and sometimes faults when put back in operation. 
The first example relates to maintenance activities being established as a result of 
recommendations after breakdowns. The second can relate to following all the vendor 
recommendations without optimisation. 
Time and resources are limited so the main objective of physical asset management is to 
determine what kind of maintenance activities that needs to be performed and the justification 
for doing it.  
RCM is a structured way to find the needed maintenance activities. Generally speaking it does 
so by asking the seven questions of the RCM process [2]: 
1. What are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset in its 
present operating context? 
2. In what ways does it fail to fulfil its functions? 
3. What causes each functional failure? 
4. What happens when each failure occurs? 
5. In what way does each failure matter? 
6. What can be done to predict or prevent each failure? 
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found? 
The methodology leads to prioritising time and resources to perform maintenance activities on 
important equipment.  As a result the installation will experience better security towards HSE, 
improved operational performance and reduced down time due to unexpected failures. [3] 
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2.2 Failure Assessment 
2.2.1 Equipment function and performance standard 
First the equipment has to be identified and analysed for its performing function. Subsequently 
the acceptable performance of the function has to be determined. 
 
   
Figure 2.2.1 [4] – Setting the 
acceptable performance 
boundaries 
When defining the boundaries remember: 
• Maintenance cannot raise the 
performance above the initial 
capacity. 
• The desired capacity must be 
reasonable and take account of the 
determination experienced in real 
conditions  
The functional failure occurs when the equipment no longer can fulfil the function to the 
standard wanted by the user. 
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2.2.2 Failure Patterns 
Failure patterns have varied over the year. From Pattern B in pre WW2 era to pattern A post 
WW2. The last 20 years the equipment has become more complex and has led to the 
understanding of six failure patterns shown in Figure 2.2.2. 
Pattern A is the bathtub curve and stands for 4 % of registered failures. It indicates infant 
mortality in the early stage of the equipment’s lifetime. Subsequently comes the useful life 
phase with probability of failure constant or gradually increasing. Finally the wear out period 
leads to higher failure rate.  
Pattern B is called wear out and stands for 2 % of failures. This shows the probability of failure 
is constant or gradually increasing and end up in the wear out period with a higher failure rate.  
 
 
Figure 2.2.3[5] - The six failure patterns 
 
Pattern C is called the gradually increasing failure pattern and stands for 5% of failures. This 
can relate to fatigue or contamination that constantly deteriorate the component and gradually 
increases the failure rate. 
Pattern D is the Initial break-in period and related to 7 % of the failures. This can relate to lack 
of routines of new equipment. For example lack of lubrication, greasing or checks. 
Pattern E is the random failure pattern with 14% of the failures. This pattern has only a 
constant probability of failure during its life span.  
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Pattern F is the infant mortality pattern and stands for 68% of the failures. This can both relate 
to human errors and equipment start up difficulties. 
The percentage relates to a study conducted by the civil aircraft industry [6]. Although the 
percentage does not perfectly represent the offshore industry, it still shows the change of 
patterns due to more complex equipment and autotomized equipment. 
 
2.2.3 Failure Analysis 
The purpose of FMEA is to identify and document potential failure modes with respective 
causes and mechanisms, and the immediate effect of the failure modes on an item/assembly. 
Failure Mode 
Is defined as the “manner in which the inability of an item to perform a required function 
occurs” [7] and can be described as the observed reason why an item is not doing its required 
function. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2[8] - Relation between Failure Mode, Failure Cause and Failure Mechanism 
(one-to-many relationship).  
 
Failure Cause 
For each failure mode there is one or more failure causes. A failure mode will usually be caused 
by one or more component failures at a lower level than the item (typically supporting 
equipment). Thus, a failure cause in this context may be a failure mode of supporting 
equipment. Due care is required so as not to confuse the Failure Cause  terminology used in this 
thesis with failure (root) cause as it is defined in the ISO 14224 and EN 13306:2010. Root cause 
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analysis is used for design purposes or after failure to reveal the “root cause” of a failure, and is 
not part of scope for determine maintenance activities. 
Failure mechanism 
For each failure cause there are one or more failure mechanisms. A failure mechanism is 
defined as: “physical, chemical or other processes which may lead or have led to failure” [9]. 
Corrosion, fatigue and wear are examples of such processes. It is typically the failure 
mechanisms that the activities in the Maintenance Strategies are mitigating steps towards, to 
prevent them from causing a failure. 
Effect of failure modes 
A failure mode is defines as: “the manner in which the inability of an item to perform a required 
function occurs” [10].   
Frequency of Failure 
The frequency of each failure mode shall be estimated to be able to assess the risk of each 
failure mode. For the Generic RCM, this is a quantitative measure, which means the anticipated 
Mean Time of Failure (MTTF) if no preventive maintenance is carried out to the equipment. 
  
 9 
 
2.3 RCM Decision Logic/Maintenance Types 
2.3.1 RCM decision diagram 
The Preventive Maintenance Program is developed using a guided logic approach. By evaluating 
possible failure management policies, it is possible to see the whole maintenance program 
reflected for a given item. The objective of RCM task selection is to select a failure management 
policy that avoids or mitigates the consequences of each identified failure mode [11]. 
 
Figure 2.3.1[1 2 ] – RCM decision diagram   
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Input to the RCM task selection process is the information described in 2.2.3 above. 
Subsequently follows a question-and-answer process in form of RCM decision logic (see Figure 
2.3.1) to determine a suitable maintenance activity/task to prevent the failure mechanism to 
cause a failure. 
The detection potential, technology available for failure detection and characteristics of a 
failure decided in the Decision Tree logic will give guidance to what type of approach is 
applicable for the maintenance activity/task. 
2.3.2 Maintenance types 
There are two types of maintenance action (see figure 2.3.1 below): 
• Preventive Maintenance, that is undertaken prior to failure to avoid or mitigate 
consequence of failures. 
• Corrective Maintenance, that is undertaken after failure has occurred to restore a 
function. 
 
        Figure 2.3.2[1 3 ] – Types of maintenance  
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There are two approaches to preventive maintenance defined as[14]: 
• Predetermined Maintenance; carried out in accordance with established intervals of 
calendar time or running hours, but without previous condition investigation. 
o Typical Predetermined Maintenance activities/tasks are Scheduled Restoration 
or Scheduled Overhaul. 
• Condition Based Maintenance; which include a combination of condition monitoring 
and/or inspection and/or testing, analysis and the ensuing maintenance actions. 
o Typical Condition Based Maintenance Activities/Tasks are Condition Monitoring, 
Inspection, Function Test and Failure Finding. 
o The Ensuing Maintenance Activities/Tasks are the actions undertaken due to 
findings or alarms triggered by Condition Based maintenance Activities/Tasks. 
This is valuable information for the planning of a PM Program, as the Ensuing 
Activities/Tasks gives indication regarding expected need for Resources, 
Workload and Operational Spares and when to expect the Ensuing 
Activities/Tasks to occur. 
In addition, any Failure Mode that is identified to have no effect if it occurs will have an 
Operator Random Observation/Run Till Failure Approach. This approach will not be part of any 
schedule preventive maintenance. However, it is assumed that as long as there are personnel 
present on an installation, any failures should be detected by the Operator in the area, and any 
ensuing/corrective actions will be handled according to corporate policies. 
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3 Description of Regulations & Standards 
3.1 Background 
The Petroleum industry in Norwegian sector is governed by legally binding laws/regulations and 
norms. Regulations like the Activity regulation have to be met. The activity regulation again 
refers to the norms for a guideline in how to meet the regulations. This chapter will point out 
the regulations and standards the thesis will build on as shown in Figure 3.1.1. 
 
       Figure 3.1.1[1 5 ]  - Hierarchy of governing laws and regulations  
What’s special about the Norwegian system is that the flexibility the PSA gives the companies. 
For example:  Activity Regulations §45 Maintenance;” The responsible party shall ensure that 
facilities or parts thereof are maintained, so that they are capable of carrying out their intended 
functions in all phases of their lifetime.” The regulation only dictates the functionality of the PSA 
goal. How the company achieves the PSA goal is up to the company to decide. But NORSOK Z-
008 can be used as a guideline to achieve compliance. 
 13 
 
3.2 Governing Regulations & Guidelines 
3.2.1 Activity Regulation 
This regulation deals how to perform petroleum activities with focus on HSE, surveys, 
operations, maintenance etc. Following is the sections from the activity regulation that build 
the basis for this thesis[16]: 
§45 Maintenance: “The responsible party shall ensure that facilities or parts thereof are 
maintained, so that they are capable of carrying out their intended functions in all phases of 
their lifetime.”  
Guideline: Maintenance means the combination of all technical, administrative and 
management measures during the life cycle of a unit intended to keep it in, or restore it to, a 
state in which it can perform its intended functions, cf. definition 2.1 (with associated 
terminology) in the NS-EN 13306 standard. 
Maintenance includes activities such as monitoring, inspection, testing and repair, and keeping 
things tidy. 
Functions also mean safety functions, cf. Section 2 of the Facilities Regulations. For these 
functions, the requirement relating to maintenance entails that performance shall be ensured at 
all times, cf. Section 8 of the Facilities Regulations. 
Facilities or parts of facilities also mean temporary equipment. 
All phases also mean periods in which the facility or parts of the facility are temporarily or 
permanently shut down. 
 
§46 Classification: “Facilities' systems and equipment shall be classified as regards the health, 
safety and environment consequences of potential functional failures.  
For functional failures that can lead to serious consequences, the responsible party shall identify 
the various fault modes with associated failure causes and failure mechanisms, and predict the 
probability of failure for the individual fault mode. 
The classification shall be used as a basis in choosing maintenance activities and maintenance 
frequencies, in prioritising between different maintenance activities and in evaluating the need 
for spare parts” 
 14 
 
Guideline: “To fulfil the classification requirement, the NORSOK Z-008 standard should be used 
in the area of health, working environment and safety. 
Fault mode, failure cause and failure mechanism as mentioned in the second subsection, are 
defined in the NS-EN 13306 standard.” 
 
§47 Maintenance Programme: “Fault modes that constitute a health, safety or environment 
risk, cf. Section 44, shall be systematically prevented through a maintenance programme. 
This programme shall include activities for monitoring performance and technical condition, 
which ensure identification and correction of fault modes that are under development or have 
occurred. 
The programme shall also contain activities for monitoring and control of failure mechanisms 
that can lead to such fault mode” 
Guideline: “The maintenance programme can consist of sub-programmes for inspection, 
testing, preventive maintenance, etc., cf. Section 45. 
The requirement relating to prevention as mentioned in the first subsection entails also that the 
programmes shall be available at start-up, cf. Section 20, second subsection, litera b. When 
preparing the maintenance programme as mentioned in the first subsection, the NS-EN ISO 
20815:2008 standard, Appendix I and the CEI/IEC 60300-3-11 standard can be used in the area 
of health, working environment and safety.” 
 
§48 Planning and prioritisation: “An overall plan shall be prepared for conducting the 
maintenance programme and corrective maintenance activities, cf. Section 12 of the 
Management Regulations. 
Criteria shall be available for setting priorities with associated deadlines for carrying out the 
individual maintenance activities. The criteria shall consider the classification as mentioned 
in Section 46.” 
Guideline: “In order to fulfill the requirement relating to time limits as mentioned in the second 
subsection, the time limits should be calculated from the time when a fault mode is identified as 
having occurred or is under development.” 
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§49 Maintenance effectiveness: “The maintenance effectiveness shall be systematically 
evaluated based on registered performance and technical condition data for facilities or parts 
thereof. 
The evaluation shall be used for continuous improvement of the maintenance programme, 
cf. Section 23 of the Management Regulations.” 
Guideline: “Maintenance effectiveness as mentioned in the first subsection means the ratio 
between the requirements stipulated for performance and technical condition and the actual 
results. 
The standards NS-EN ISO 14224 and NS-EN ISO 20815, Appendix E, should be used when 
registering data as mentioned in the first subsection, including failure data and maintenance 
data.” 
3.2.2 Management Regulation 
§12 Planning: “The responsible party shall plan the enterprise's activities in accordance with the 
stipulated objectives, strategies and requirements so that the plans give due consideration to 
health, safety and the environment. 
The resources necessary to carry out the planned activities shall be made available to project 
and operational organisations.”[17] 
Guideline: “The plans as mentioned in the first subsection can be plans where health, safety and 
environment are integral parts, or plans for own health, safety and environment activities. 
Examples of plans where health, safety and environment are an integrated part include plans 
for maintenance or operations. 
The resources mentioned in the second subsection, can include infrastructure, personnel and 
information.” 
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3.3 NORSOK Standard 
Since OAI follow NORSOK methodology, NORSOK Z-008 will for the fundament for this thesis. 
The NORSOK Standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry to reduce cost in 
the development and operation phase of installations on Norwegian shelf. Additionally 
standard serves as a reference to the authority regulations 
The NORSOK standard are administrated and published by Standard Norway with the support 
of The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF), The Federation of Norwegian Industry, 
Norwegian Ship owners Association and The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) [18].  
NORSOK Z-008 is made to give requirements and guidelines for establishment of technical 
hierarchy, consequence classification and spare part evaluation. Additionally it gives guidelines 
on how to use the consequence classification in the maintenance management as well as 
establishment and update of the PM program based on risk analysis. 
3.3.1 Maintenance Management Loop 
The main objective of NORSOK Z-008 is to give input to how to achieve and maintain the 
maintenance management loop as shown in Figure 3.3.1. The top four blocks deals activity 
regulation §45, §46, §47 and §48 in how to prepare a PM-program and execute the 
maintenance. While the bottom three deals with activity regulation §49 in how to enhance the 
effectiveness.  
 
Figure 3.3.1[1 9 ]  - Maintenance Management Loop  
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Most companies manage the top four blocks of the maintenance management loop but fail on 
the bottom three. In other words, they manage to decide what kind of maintenance philosophy 
to apply to their installation (condition monitoring on high critical equipment, Preventive 
maintenance on medium and corrective on low critical), make a maintenance strategy (which 
maintenance activities to perform and when to do it), schedule the work orders in a CMMS 
system and execute the maintenance.  
Where many fail is to improve the maintenance management system. Maintenance reports do 
not cover proposals for improvement in terms of failure modes, maintenance activity 
adjustment and resource (work load and material) needs. With no input improving the 
maintenance system is difficult [20]. 
3.3.2 Establishment of a New Plant  
New installations entering Norwegian waters are required to have an operational PM-program. 
This is to have control over all equipment in terms of where it is located, what function it does, 
consequence of failure, if it is a barrier and what kind of maintenance to perform on it. The 
classical way to establishing the PM-program is the RCM process. But NORSOK encourage using 
Generic Maintenance concepts in combination with the RCM methodology to better capture 
the company knowledge of maintenance tasks and make it standardized. 
The main building blocks of the maintenance system are Technical hierarchy, consequence 
classification and generic maintenance concepts 
Technical hierarchy - A function based technical structure of an installation that shows how 
equipment in a function relates to each other. See appendix A for workflow and examples. 
The purpose of the technical hierarchy is[21]: 
• show technical interdependencies of the installation; 
• retrieval of tags, equipment and spare parts; 
• retrieval of documents and drawings; 
• retrieval of historical maintenance data from CMMS; 
• planning of operations (e.g. relationships due to shutdown etc.); 
• cost allocation and retrieval; 
• planning and organization of the maintenance programme; 
• planning of corrective work 
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Consequence Classification - A classification starts with dividing the installations systems by 
the function it performs (see appendix B.1 for example).  Subsequently this function is classified 
with the consequence of failure in regard to HSE, production and cost with three grades, high, 
medium and low and assessed for the functions redundancy  (See appendix B.3 for example). 
The classification is performed based on a consequence criteria matrix where the limit or 
accept criteria for each consequence grade is determined. Only the main function if evaluated 
and subsystems inherit a consequence according to the inherit rules (See appendix B.2 for 
example). Finally tags are linked to correct function and inherit its consequence and 
redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2[22] - Functional hierarchy, example with standard sub function and 
classification  
  
 19 
 
The consequence classification together with other key information and parameters gives input 
to the following activities and processes[23]:  
• selection of equipment where detailed RCM/RBI/FMECA analysis is recommended 
(screening process); 
• establish PM programme; 
• preparation and optimisation of GMCs; 
• design evaluations; 
• prioritisation of work orders; 
• spare part evaluations. 
 
Maintenance Strategy (generic maintenance concept, Performance standards for 
barriers) - A Generic Maintenance Concept (GMC) is the companies best practice maintenance 
for an equipment group with same failure modes and operating conditions. The goal for the 
GMC is to ensure that requirements for HSE, production, cost and other requirements are met 
and documented in RCM/FMECA analysis. (See Appendix C for GMC example) 
The result of a consistent GMC leads to [24]: 
• establish a company`s minimum requirements to maintenance, 
• reduce the effort in establishing the maintenance programme as similar 
equipment/technologies are preanalyzed, 
• ensure uniform and consistent maintenance activities, 
• facilitate analysis of equipment groups, 
• provide proper documentation of selected maintenance strategies, 
• ensure experience transfer between plants with similar technology and operation. 
  
 
  
 20 
 
The workflow of establishment of a new PM-program 
1- The equipment is grouped and classified by making the technical hierarchy and consequence 
classification. 
2- Identify the barriers and the performance standards for testing them according to OLF-070 or 
IEC 61508. These test intervals are scheduled in the PM-program. 
 
Figure 3.3.3 [25] – Establishment of PM-program for a new installation
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3- Determine if a GMC exist for the equipment, if yes update with eventual authority or 
company requirements. 
4- Adjust the GMC to the local conditions on the plant in terms of the production value for the 
specific case versus and repair capacity to handle the most common failure modes. 
5- If no GMC exist a thorough study must be performed for medium and high consequence 
equipment. NORSOK recommends that a RCM/RBI/SIL analysis should be carried about 
according to IEC-60300-3-11 and DNV EP-G101. Identification of failure modes and MTTF should 
primary be based on operational experience of the actual equipment but generic failure data 
for similar equipment can be used as an alternative. 
Intervals are primarily based on engineering judgment and a cost-benefit assessment including:  
• consequences of function or sub-function failures and functional redundancy; 
• probability of function or sub-function failures and its function of time or  
frequency of PM activities; 
• detectability of failure and failure mechanisms, including the time available to  
make necessary mitigating actions to avoid critical function or sub-function  
failure; 
• cost of alternative preventive activities. 
6- Define a maintenance concept from the data gathered in the RCM/RBI/SIL analysis.  
7- Low consequence equipment is primarily set to run to failure. If detecting cost-benefit 
reasons to perform maintenance low consequence equipment can be included in the PM-
program.  
8- Finally the maintenance program is packed. The maintenance plans and tasks are packed 
based on production/operation plans, turnaround activities and recourse requirements. 
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3.3.4 Reporting, Analysis and Improvements 
The historical failure rate data used when establishing the new PM-program may be lower or 
higher than the actual failure rates on the specific installation. To optimize the PM-program, 
corrective and preventive maintenance activities must be reported according to Table 2.3.1. 
 
Corrective Maintenance Preventive Maintenance 
Failure mode 
Failure cause 
Failure mechanisms 
Equipment down time 
Spare parts used 
Man hours for activity 
Start and finish time to repair 
Condition of equipment before PM work 
Man hours for activity 
Spare parts used 
Start and finish time 
Table 3.3.1[2 6 ]  - Reporting of maintenance data  
 
With historical data the effectiveness of the maintenance can be evaluated up against the Key 
performance indicators.  According to the minimum of KPIs should be [27]:  
• failure fraction from functional testing of safety critical equipment; 
• PM man-hours; 
• corrective maintenance man-hours; 
• backlog PM, total number of hours; 
• backlog PM, number of hours HSE critical; 
• backlog corrective maintenance, total number of hours; 
• backlog corrective maintenance, number of hours HSE critical. 
Some of the reports will need a further analysis to find the root-cause of the failure to prevent 
reoccurrence.  
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The triggers are[28]:  
• HSE related equipment failure, 
• unacceptable production losses, 
• cost of single failure events in terms of downtime, repair cost or spare cost, 
• number of repeated failures over a given time period for key components, 
• hidden failures (exceeding requirements) detected during test, 
• technical condition assessments. 
Implementation of actions may lead to update of maintenance program, operational routines, 
training etc.  
 
3.3.4 Updating the PM-program 
A PM-program is a living system and need updates to provide a correct and effective 
maintenance to the installations equipment.  
 AN update is needed when[29]: 
• the observed failure rate is significantly different from what was expected, i.e.: 
o higher failure rate is observed requiring a change in maintenance strategy or 
frequency – or replacement of the unit; 
o lower failure rate, or no observed damage at PM may point towards extension of 
intervals or omitting certain tasks. 
• the operational environment has changed causing different consequence and 
probability: 
o less or more production; 
o change in product composition. 
• cost of maintenance different from expected; 
• new technology that could make the maintenance more efficient (like new methods for  
condition monitoring) is available; 
• updated regulations; 
• information from vendor; 
• modifications. 
 24 
 
The historical failure rate data used when establishing the new PM-program may be lower or 
higher than the actual failure rates on the specific installation. To optimize the PM-program, 
corrective and preventive maintenance activities must be reported according to Table 2.1.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2[30] – Progress for updating maintenance program  
The result will be a failure database for the specific installation which will provide the 
documentation needed to update the maintenance intervals both for safety critical elements 
and general equipment as shown in Figure 3.3.2. 
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3.4 Additional activities based on IEC 60300-3-11  
The RCM process defined in IEC 60300-3-11 is shown in Figure 3.4.1 bellow. Several steps in the 
RCM process are redundant compared to what already has been performed according to 
NORSOK Z-008, shown in Figure 3.3.2. Additional activities are marked bold. 
 
Figure 3.4.1[3 1 ] – Overview of the RCM process  
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1 Initiation and planning 
a) The boundaries and objectives of the analysis are already covered by establishment of 
technical hierarchy, consequence classification, and barrier assessment (Step 1, 2 and 3 
in Figure 3.3.2). Equipment types not a barrier with a consequence of medium or high 
without a maintenance concept shall be analysed in a FMECA/RCM. 
b) The content must be decided. For maintenance purposes a failure analysis must be 
performed to identify the possible failure modes on the equipment type.  
c) Has not already been covered. Specialist knowledge, outside expertise and 
responsibilities must be decided.  
d) The operating context should describe how the equipment is operated and give 
information on desired system operationally. Step 1 in Figure 3.3.2 covers for the most 
pare the information needed as the consequence classification informs what kind if 
function the equipment performs and the redundancy grade.  
Additional information to determine: 
• environmental conditions (climate) that lead to additional failure modes 
• inactive equipment must be identified 
2 Functional failure analyses 
a, b and c) Failure modes are not covered by Z-008 and has to be performed by a 
FMECA according to IEC 60300-3-11. 
3 Task selection 
a) Failure consequences are for the most part already covered by the consequence 
assessment (Step 1 Figure 3.3.2).  
B and c) Countermeasures with intervals against the failure mechanisms need to be 
determined in GMC workshops according to step 6 in Figure 3.3.2. 
4 Implementation 
a, b and c) Identefying maintenance details, prioritizing and rationalisation of 
maintenance intervals are covered in z-008 by stem 4 and 8 shown in figure 3.3.2. 
d) Initial age exploration is not covered. 
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5 Implementation 
A and b) Monitoring of maintenance effectiveness and safety, operational and economic 
targets are covered by z-008 mentioned in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 above. 
e) Subsequent age exploration is not covered. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
NORSOK Z-008 covers almost all aspects to be in compliance with the PSA demand in terms of 
the PM-program. The additional information needed deals with failure assessment and is 
covered by IEC-60300-3-11 and described in Chapter 2. 
Failure data play a key role in all phases of the maintenance management.  At early stage the 
maintenance activities are set to prevent or delay a failure mechanism to occur and the 
maintenance interval is set based on the failure modes MTTF. 
In later phases failure data is used to maintenance optimization based on actual failure modes 
occurring on the installation in relations to both preventive and corrective maintenance 
activities. 
Learning from failure is the key of improving the performance of a maintenance system or 
organization. Thus, identification of failure modes and using the experienced failure data will 
lead to good maintenance control and less fire fighting with unexpected corrective 
maintenance, production loss and danger to HSE. 
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4 Description of Oceaneering Asset Integrity 
4.1 Introduction 
Oceaneering Asset Integrity became a new part of Oceaneering after AGR Field Operations was 
bought in December 2011. 
The main focus areas of OAI are inspection (both planning and performing) and maintenance 
management.  
The maintenance management delivers for the most part two services; A project to deliver 
parts to a PM-program or a service agreement to update and maintain an existing PM-program. 
The main modules OIA deliver for a PM-program is: 
• Technical hierarchy 
• Barrier identification and assessment with performance standards 
• Ex, containment identification. 
• Consequence classification 
• Spare Part Evaluation 
• Establishment of Generic Maintenance Concepts 
• Packing of PM-program 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, OAI use its self-developed KAMFER 7 tool for storing, processing 
and deliver data. 
KAMFER 7 consist of three main modules; Technical hierarchy, Consequence Analysis and 
Maintenance Concept which are under development to include all the functionality for 
delivering RCM according to PSA regulations. 
OAI has also an online portal under development which is linked to KAMFER 7. This view has 
the same three modules as KAMFER 7.  This leads to good illustration of the asset from a 
customs point of view and can also be used for links to P&ids and other documentation. 
Additionally the portal can be used by the customers to give feedback on its content directly 
into KAMFER 7. Thus removing need for point of contact, accumulation of mails and provide 
records of decisions made and work process. 
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4.2 Technical Hierarchy Module 
The Technical Hierarchy Module is a tool for establishing a hierarchical register of all 
equipment/tags/items in an installation. It is also possible to register all relevant technical 
data/information for each equipment/tags/items, such as Maker, Ex-class, P&ID etc. as 
additional attributes.  
The methodology for making the technical hierarchy are based on to NORSOK Z-008 with an 
additional feature; the possibility for numerous custom hierarchies.  
The Custom hierarchy application is a useful tool to register attributes to a tag/equipment in a 
structured manner such as: 
• Performance Standards/Barrier tag 
identification 
• Equipment Types and Sub-Equipment 
Types 
• Location (predefined areas on the 
installation) 
• Ex-Class 
• Responsible Discipline/Department 
(useful for packing of PM Program, as 
some Equipment Strategies can be the 
responsibility of more than one 
Discipline/Department) 
• Maker/Vendor of equipment 
• DNV Class Survey Codes 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1[3 2 ] - Technical Hierarchy 
Module 
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4.3 Consequence Analysis Module 
The Consequence Analysis Module, shown in figure 4.2.2 bellow, is a tool for performing 
equipment classification in a systematic way according to the NORSOK Z-008 Standard 
methodology in close cooperation with experienced customer personnel. All functions 
identified for an installation is structured in a Functional Hierarchy, where system and 
installation effect (consequence) of a functional failure, redundancy within a function, drawing 
reference and so on are among data that can be registered and processed in this module. 
 
Figure 4.3.1[33] – Kamfer 7 Functional hierarchy and consequence view 
After the consequence analysis tags are linked to its belonging sub function according to Figure 
3.3.2. Thus receiving a consequence of failure based on high, medium and low for HSE, 
production and cost (Other).   
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4.4 Generic Maintenance Concepts Module 
4.4.1 Data base history 
The development of the OAIs Maintenance Concepts started in the late 80s as a manning 
analysis for an offshore installation. The goal was to identify the man hours and discipline 
categories required for maintenance.  
In order to give good estimates for the man hours required, it was necessary to identify 
maintenance activities that were to be done on the installation. Regulatory requirements and 
criticality of equipment was part of the analyses to identify what activities were required to do 
as a minimum. 
These analyses led to identification of strategies for the various equipment types, compiled on 
maintenance concepts, where, in a generic way, equal equipment working under equal 
conditions should be maintained equally. 
The RCM methodology was introduced for this work, and the NORSOK Z-008 Standard was 
established in a parallel process. 
In the early 90s the maintenance concepts were continuously improved during a series of 
workshops with experienced offshore personnel from different offshore production 
installations. The knowledge they usually carried with them in their "little black book" was now 
systematically registered and documented for each equipment type as best practice/strategies, 
i.e. maintenance concepts. 
In mid 90s the first version of the Kamfer software was developed to be able to register 
maintenance activities and man hours in a systematic manner. 
Kamfer has since gone through several versions and projects. An extensive database of 
activities and strategies are built up but the link to the failure modes the corresponding failure 
mechanisms has been lost. Kamfer 7s GMC module is set to restore that link. 
The Maintenance Concepts Module in Kamfer 7 consists of sub-modules which include: 
• Failure mode assessment 
• Activity selection and  work load assessment 
• Maintenance Concept creator (Pre-determined, Condition Based and Corrective 
Activities may be included in scope) 
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4.2.1 Failure assessment 
Input to the RCM task selection process shall be the Failure Modes received from the FMEA 
module that will be discussed in chapter 7. 
The frequency of each failure mode shall be estimated to be able to assess the risk of each 
failure mode and shall be based on one or more of the following sources: 
- Maker/vendor failure data for the component (if available) 
- available databases for failure data (OREDA, PDS etc.) 
- historical failure data for the equipment (if available) 
- expert judgment from available experience and knowledge to the equipment class. 
With the failure modes identified follows a question-and-answer process in form of Decision 
Tree logic to determine a suitable maintenance activity/task to prevent the failure mechanism 
to cause a failure.  
The detection potential, technology available for failure detection and characteristics of a 
failure decided in the Decision Tree logic will give guidance to what type of approach is 
applicable for the maintenance activity. 
The starting point in the Decision Tree Logic (see Figure 4.4.1) is to specify the Local Effect of 
any Failure Mode, based on the Local Effect Comments in the FMEA.  
The detection method determines how and by which means the failure is detected by operator 
or maintainer, and is decided by determine if:  
- failure is Hidden or Evident 
- failure development is detectable 
- degradation is evident for the operator 
- any state-of-the-art condition assessment is available and cost effective 
The failure characteristic is decided by determine whether: 
- Hidden failure can be verified by test/inspection 
- Failure rate is increasing with age 
- Failure resistance can be restored by rework 
- Failure is predictable as a function of calendar/operating time 
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The output of the decisions in the Decision Tree logic will then determine the Maintenance 
Method/type approach: 
- Preventive  
o Pre-determined 
o Condition based 
Random Observation/Planned Corrective – Corrective 
 
 
     Figure 4.4.1[34] – Decision Tree Logic in Kamfer 7  
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Activity Class defines the Maintenance Method for each Activity/Task in the OAI Maintenance 
Concepts, and is the next step from the Decision Tree Logic. As illustrated in Figure 2.3.2 – 
Types of maintenance tasks, the Activity Class defines whether the Activity/Task is Preventive 
or Corrective, and whether the Activity/Task is a Predetermined or Condition Based approach. 
Preventive Maintenance Activity Classes are defined in Kamfer 7 as: 
P - Predetermined 
- Typically scheduled replacement or overhaul without previous condition investigation 
T - Condition Continuous Monitoring 
- Typically instruments online measuring of vibration, self-diagnostics/test etc 
I - Condition Periodic Monitoring 
- Typically operator/maintainer doing periodic inspection, vibration check etc. 
E - Event Based (Predetermined or Condition Based) 
- Typical Activity/Task that must be triggered at a change of operational state, prior 
to/after use of equipment etc. Can be of Predetermined or Condition Based approach. 
B - Condition Based Ensuing Activity/Task 
- Activity/Task triggered by an alarm/condition found from Continuous or Periodic 
Condition Based test/inspection. 
C - Planned Corrective Activity/Task 
- Activities/Tasks identified needed to be undertaken when Planned Corrective approach 
is decided for an equipment. 
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4.4.2 Activity selection and workload assessment 
After identifying what kind of maintenance method is needed the maintenance activity is 
decided in the activity selection window. Several different activities types is stored on the 
database and the customer can chose the strategy (condition monitoring or preventive 
maintenance) they want or establish a new activity to mitigate the failure mechanism.  
 
Figure 4.4.2[35] - Activity selection and workload assessment 
Each activity is assessed for the need of shut down, regulatory demands (if yes, link to the 
requirement), duration of the activity, responsible discipline, activity class, a long text for 
explanation of the activity to the maintenance concept and a detailed work instruction to be 
implemented in the PM-program. Additionally the workload is assessed by identifying the 
discipline needed, quantity of men per discipline and duration each discipline participates.  
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4.4.3 Maintenance concept view 
Finally chosen activities are given an interval in and included in the Generic Maintenance 
concept. 
Intervals in the OAI Maintenance Concepts are implicit a risk based approach according to the 
following Rule of Thumb for setting intervals for Preventive Maintenance Activities from Failure 
Modes : 
Failure Consequence Max  Interval from Failure Frequency 
High Lowest Frequency in range of Failure divided by 3 
Medium Lowest Frequency in range of Failure divided by 2 
Low Planned Corrective (P.C.) 
Table 4.4.2[2 0 ]  - Risk based interval selection 
The intervals of the activities can be differentiated on of the Consequence, Redundancy (The 
example in Figure 4.4.3 only differentiates between consequence high, medium and low.), and 
also the effect of the failure modes (failure consequence).  
 
Figure 4.4.3[3 6 ] – Maintenance Concept view  
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4.5 PM-Program 
4.5.1 General packing procedures 
The PM-Program is packed to keep down time at a minimum. This is done by differentiation 
between activities which need for shut down and activities which can be performed under 
operation in addition to controlling the workload/duration.  
The complexity on the packing depends on the customers CMMS system. The packing can range 
from scheduling activities per tag independently to packing multiple equipment units of 
belonging functions or areas together, which creates work orders on activities with the same 
interval.  
 
4.5.2 Prioritizing of preventive work orders 
Recommended priority of Preventive Maintenance Program is based on based on Risk, with 
failure consequence from the consequence assessment and MTTF from the failure mode 
assessment. 
 
 Probability MTTF Priority of Preventive Activity 
Very High 0-1 Years High (to redesign) High Medium 
High 1-2 Years High High Medium 
Moderate 2-5 Years High Medium Low 
Low 5-10 Years High Medium Low 
Very Low 10-20 Years Medium Low Low 
Unlikely >20 Years Medium Low Low 
Failure Consequence C-High C-Medium C-Low 
Table 4.5.1[37] – Prioritizing of preventive work orders 
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4.5.3 Prioritizing of corrective work orders 
Recommended Priority of Corrective Work Orders based on Consequence only, as the failure 
has already occurred, i.e. probability of failure is 100%: 
 
 Redundancy 
A B C 
Barrier Tag High-High (1) High-High (1) High-High (1) 
Co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
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ax
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n 
C-High High (2) Medium (3) Medium (3) 
C-Medium Medium (3) Low (4) Low (4) 
C-Low Low (4) Low (5) Low (5) 
Table 4.5.2[38] – Prioritizing of corrective work orders 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Oceaneering Asset Integrity in in compliance with the PSA regulation and RCM methodology for 
the top four phases in the maintenance management loop except for failure modes as a basis 
for the maintenance activities. 
Additionally OAI do not deliver any services for maintenance optimisation other than reducing 
maintenance activities based on equipment consequence. Which means low and medium 
equipment can be deleted from the PM-program to only perform maintenance on High 
consequence equipment and barriers.  
However optimization of maintenance intervals and resource needs is not covered.  
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5 OREDA 
5.1 Introduction of OREDA 
Reliability of equipment is a decisive factor for HSE and continuous production of offshore 
installations. Norwegian and foreign oil companies cooperated with SINTEF Technology and 
Society, Dept. of Safety and Reliability, DNV and other consultants for the collection of 
maintenance, reliability and safety data on offshore installations. [39]   
OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) Project was initiated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(now Petroleum Safety Authority, PSA) in 1981[39]. The purpose of the project was to survey the 
reliability of equipment under operational conditions. 
Since 1983 OREDA has been run by a group of oil companies. One member and one deputy 
member from each participating company form the steering comity. The steering comity elects 
one chairman and a project manager from its members.  
At the moment OREDA has established an extensive database with reliability and maintenance 
data for offshore equipment from different geographic areas, installations, equipment types 
and operational conditions. The database contains of the moment data from 265 installations 
and 16 000 equipment with 38 000 failure and 68 000 maintenance records [39] .   
The data is collected, retrieved and analysed by the developed OREDA software and stored in 
the OREDA database. 
Several oil and gas companies have contributed to the database. Presently the participants are 
BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd, ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS, ENI S.p.S Exploration & 
Production Division, ExxonMobil Production Company, Gassco, GdF SUEZ E&P Norge AS, 
Pertobas S.A, Shell Global Solutions UK, TOTAL S.A and Statoil ASA[39].  
Steve Burchell from BP has been the chairman of the OREDAs steering comity since February 1st 
2010. 
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5.2 OREDA Reliability Data Handbook 
5.2.1 Handbook revisions 
The Reliability Data has been published through the OREDA Reliability Data Handbook in five 
editions (1984, -92, -97, -02, -09), and are sold in over 50 countries worldwide. 
As shown in Table 5.2, the OREDA-09 Handbook covers a range of equipment types collected 
from data collection phase IV to VII in the period 1993-2003. 
System Equipment class Data from 2002 edition 
included in 2009 edition 
New data in 
2009 edition 
Total 2009 
edition 
Phase IV Phase V Phases VI+VII  
No. of units No. of units No. of units No. of units 
1 Machinery 1.1 Compressors 
1.2 Gas Turbines 
1.3 Pumps 
1.4 Comb. Engines 
1.5 Turbo expanders 
75 
56 
56 
32 
160 
75 
8 
 
 
52 
23 
2 
131 
88 
212 
98 
10 
2 Electric 
Equipment 
2.1 El. Generators 
2.2 El. Motors 
 26 
128 
6 
15 
32 
143 
3 Mechanical 
Equipment 
3.1 Heat exchangers 
3.2 Vessels 
3.3 Heaters & boilers 
 
148 
11 
17 
50 
1 
4 21 
198 
12 
4 Other Topside 
Equipment 
4.1 F&G Detectors 
4.2 Process sensors 
4.3 Contr. Logic Units 
4.4-4.5 Valves 
 779 
69 
 
331 
139 
 
10 
576 
918 
69 
10 
907 
Sum Topside  290 1732 827 2849 
Table 5.2.1 [40]  - Equipment population in the 2009 OREDA Topside Handbook  
 
OREDA 2009 is issued in two volumes; Volume 1 covers topside equipment while volume 2 
covers subsea equipment. As the OIA's Generic Maintenance Concepts covers mainly topside 
equipment, only Volume 1 of the OREDA Handbook 2009 is considered in this paper.  
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5.2.2 Equipment boundaries 
Each equipment class has surrounding equipment which performs a function for or together 
with the equipment class in question. Equipment typically part of the equipment unit and 
equipment essential for the function of the equipment class is placed within the equipment 
boundary.  
 
Figure 5.2.1[4 1 ] – Boundary definition for pumps  
Special considerations: 
• Connected units (electric motor on a pump) is considered as an independent equipment 
unit and not included with the pump. Failures in the connection between the different 
units (coupling between the motor and pump) are included to the driven unit as long as 
the fault do not specifically relate to the driving unit outside the boundary. 
• Where the driven and the driving unit share a common system (cooling) the common 
systems failure modes is places under the driven unit. 
• Failure recordings for instrumentation is only included if the instrumentation is locally 
mounted or is performing a control/monitoring function. 
 
  
 42 
 
5.2.3 Reliability data tables 
There are three different information tables belonging to each equipment group. The reliability 
data shown in Table 5.2 give the failure mode information with belonging failure rate. The 
Maintenance item versus failure mode shown in table 5.2.3 show which items the failure 
modes occur on. Finally table5.2.4 shows which failure mechanisms that causes the failure 
modes.  
All estimates are based on the assumption that the equipment is in its useful life phase. This 
means the bottom of the bath tub shape for failure rates, where the rate is close to constant 
[42].  
Reliability data table: 
Taxonomy no 
 1.3.1 
Item 
Machinery 
Pumps 
Centrifugal 
Population 
156 
Installations 
19 
Aggregated time in service (𝟏𝟎𝟔 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒓𝒔) No of demands 
5018 Calendar time * 
3.2412 
Operational time † 
2.1290 
Failure mode No of 
failures 
Failure rates per 𝟏𝟎𝟔 Active rep. 
hours 
Man hours 
Lower Mean Upper SD 𝜼/τ Mean Max Mean Max 
Critical 
 
External leakage- Process 
Medium 
 
Degraded 
 
External leakage- Process 
Medium 
 
Incipient 
 
External leakage- Process 
Medium 
 
 
 
47* 
47† 
 
 
 
9* 
9† 
 
 
 
22* 
22† 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
 
0.02 
0.08 
 
 
 
- 
0.03 
 
 
4.93 
8.89 
 
 
 
2.35 
3.79 
 
 
 
3.63 
6.68 
 
 
26.48 
48.13 
 
 
 
7.84 
11.71 
 
 
 
17.31 
24.73 
 
 
17.09 
22.36 
 
 
 
2.87 
4.13 
 
 
 
7.11 
9.13 
 
 
14.05 
22.08 
 
 
 
2.78 
4.23 
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Table 5.2.2[43] - Format of Reliability data tables in the OREDA-09 Handbook  
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The example in Table 5.2.2 show one failure mode for a general centrifugal pump with failure 
rates for both operational and calendar time per severity class. Since the repair hours and man-
hour is not a part of this thesis that information will not be included in the later reliability 
tables. 
Explanation of data entries[47]: 
Taxonomy No: The Numerical identification number for the equipment units.  
Population: How many units of one equipment type in service during the data gathering. 
Installations: Number of installations participated in the data gathering of the equipment 
group. 
Calendar time: The time equipment has performed its function during the data gathering. The 
calendar time is given with a high accuracy. 
Operational time: The time a unit has been under surveillance during data gathering.The 
operational time is less accurate and is in many cases based in estimates by the data collector. 
Severity Class Types:  
From ISO 14224, the Failure severities are defined as: 
Critical Failure: “failure of an equipment unit that causes an immediate cessation of the ability 
to perform a required function. NOTE, Includes failures requiring immediate action towards 
cessation of performing the function, even though actual operation can continue for a short 
period of time. A critical failure results in an unscheduled repair.”[44]       
Degraded Failure: “failure that does not cease the fundamental function(s), but compromises 
one or several functions. NOTE, The failure can be gradual, partial or both. The function can be 
compromised by any combination of reduced, increased or erratic outputs. An immediate repair 
can normally be delayed but, in time, such failures can develop into a critical failure if corrective 
actions are not taken.” [44]       
Incipient Failure: “imperfection in the state or condition of an item so that a degraded or critical 
failure might (or might not) eventually be the expected result if corrective actions are not 
taken.” [45] 
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Failure Impact is defined as: “impact of a failure on equipment’s function(s) or on the 
plant. NOTE, on the equipment level, failure impact can be classified in three classes (critical, 
degraded, incipient).”[46]  
However, as OIA are using the OREDA failure data for establishing Generic Maintenance 
Concepts, a Critical Failure in the OREDA Handbook is not necessarily a severe failure with 
regards to HSE, Production or Cost in itself. The failure impact in combination with the 
consequence from the Function Hierarchy Consequence Assessment as described in chapter 4.3 
will determine if a failure is a severe failure in accordance to the requirement in the Activity 
Regulation §46. The Local Effect, Unsafe failure, in Kamfer 7 will always be a severe failure 
regardless of the consequence of the equipment, e.g. Earth Fault on a motor that is assessed to 
be Low Consequence in the Consequence Assessment. 
Unknown: Failure severity was not or could not be determined. 
Failure rates:  
All entries refer to 106 hours and calendar time.  
Failure rate (λ) = 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 (𝑛)
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
 
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) = 
1
𝜆
 
Mean: The mean failure rate obtained by the OREDA estimator based on the installation 
participating in the data gathering 
Lower/Upper: An interval covering 90% variation between the various samples 
SD: The standard deviation determining the variation between multiple samples. 
𝜂/τ: The total amount of failures divided the total time in service assuming homogenous 
sample. 
 
  
 45 
 
Maintenance versus failure mode: 
To perform a FMEA/FMECA there is need for information about which maintenance items the 
failure modes occur to.  
 AIR BRD ELP ELU XXX Sum 
Casing - 0.45 1.05 0.15 XXX 5 
Piping - - 3.38 3.38 xxx 15 
Instrument, 
flow 
4.35 - 0.15 - xxx 4 
Seals - 0.15 6.68 13.66 xxx 50 
Valves - - 1.05 0.15 xxx 2 
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 24 
Total 4.35 0.6 12.31 17.34 xxx 100 
Table 5.2.3[48]  - Maintenance item versus Failure mode 
Each Maintenance item-Failure mode combination shows the items relative contribution to the 
total failure rate in percentage. Additionally the sum column show how much each specific 
maintenance item contributes in percentage to the total failure rates. 
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Failure mechanism versus failure mode: 
A maintenance activity is set to prevent or delay a failure mechanism to occur/develop.  
 AIR BRD ELP ELU XXX Sum 
Blockage/plugged - 0.45 1.05 0.15 XXX 5 
Mechanical 
failure-general 
- - 3.38 3.38 xxx 15 
Instrument 
failure-general 
4.35 - 0.15 - xxx 4 
Corrosion - 0.15 6.68 13.66 xxx 50 
Erosion - - 1.05 0.15 xxx 2 
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 24 
Total 4.35 0.6 12.31 17.34 xxx 100 
Table 5.2.4[49] – Failure mechanism versus failure mode 
Each failure mechanism-Failure mode combination shows the failure mechanisms relative 
contribution to the total failure rate in percentage. Additionally the sum column show how 
much each specific failure mechanism contributes in percentage to the total failure rates. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The OREDA data is primary a reliability data base to be used in availability analysis to provide a 
basis for engineering, fabrication and operation. 
However in an initial phase of a maintenance system historic data may be lacking and OREDA 
provide the best available data source to determine failure modes with MTTF. 
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6 Reference data 
6.1 Statoil/OAI Failure Mode Project 
The Statoil/OAI failure mode project was performed in late 2008 to early 2009.  
The participants were experienced personnel from Statoil and OAI (AGR) and all maintenance 
concepts in the OAI database were evaluated for Failure modes, cause and mechanism. 
Additionally local effect, hidden failure and preventive maintenance tasks were evaluated.   
OREDA data was used in the early phase were the MTTF was calculated from critical severity 
and mean failure rate. But eventually the participant used experience to determine the MTTF 
since the OREDA calculations deviated from the expected values [20]. 
The MTTF they used were [50]: 
• 0-1 Years 
• 1-2 Years 
• 2-5 Years 
• 5-10 Years 
• 10-20 Years 
• >20 Years 
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7 Analysis and Discussion 
7.1 FMEA module 
The Generic Maintenance Strategies lack the FMEA part for documentation of the different 
maintenance activities. The FMEA module is connected in the Generic Maintenance Module 
and will be available in GMC workshops and GMC reports. 
The following fields shall be implemented in the Failure Mode or FMEA module based in input 
from IEC-60300-3-11 and ISO 14224: 
Prevented by Activity Number(s): This will display the preventive activities/strategies identified 
as countermeasures for the respective Failure Mode. 
Object: Will display the specific object/item influenced by the respective failure mode. 
Examples, impeller of pump, gasket, bearing etc.  
Failure Mode: This needs to be a drop-down box of Failure Modes (See table D.1)based on ISO 
14224 with a few modifications by OAI. 
This box will display a list of identified Failure Modes for the equipment covered by the GMC. 
Failure mode note: This field will be for a description or comments/notes for each respective 
Failure Mode. 
Fail cause: Display the Failure Cause of each respective Failure Mode. 
This is a text field where the Failure Cause shall be typed in as "free-text". However, Table D.1 
shows examples of failure causes and should be used for consistency. 
Fail Mechanism: Display the Failure Mechanism of each respective Failure Cause. 
This should be a drop-down box with Failure Mechanisms taken from ISO 14224 (see table D.2). 
Fail Mechanism Note: Display additional comments/notes for each respective Failure 
Mechanism. 
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Frequency OAI (quantitative MTTF): Display the expected MTTF for each respective Failure 
Mode based on expert’s experiences and analysis. 
This Frequency shall be the anticipated Mean Time to Failure if no preventive maintenance is 
carried out to the equipment. 
This quantitative MTTF should be grouped into six levels, to better represent each Clients 
grading of probability of failure. The recommended six levels of MTTF in the OAI Maintenance 
Concepts Database for the quantitative MTTF are: 
 Probability MTTF 
Very High 0-1 Years 
High 1-2 Years 
Moderate 2-5 Years 
Low 5-10 Years 
Very Low 10-20 Years 
Unlikely >20 Years 
Table7.1.1 [5 1 ]  -Recommended OAI frequency 
The Frequency OAI values in the OAI Maintenance Concepts shall be based on the best practice 
from FMEA/RCM analysis and input from experienced personnel through workshops from a 
number of installations. 
However, for each new Client/Installation, the Frequency Analysis value shall be 
verified/updated in workshops based on the Client personnel's experiences, FMEA input if any, 
and the Clients historical failure data if any. This is to establish Client personnel ownership to 
the analysis, traceability for each Item/Tag to the analysis, and update of Clients database to 
include new/improved design. 
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Analysis Ref: Displays reference to the workshop/analysis where each Failure Mode and 
respective Frequency OAI value is verified/updated. 
This field is empty in the OAI Maintenance Concept Database, except for any detailed 
FMEA/RCM performed by OAI. This field shall be filled with reference to the workshops where a 
Failure Mode or Frequency AGR field is verified/updated, to establish Client personnel 
ownership to the analysis, traceability for each Item/Tag to the analysis. 
 Local Effect: Displays the consequence of each respective Failure Mode on the equipment in 
the Concept, and is defined in the Decision Tree logic (Figure 4.4.1). 
Local Effect is divided into 3 types of consequences in Kamfer 7 as Unsafe Failure, Loss of 
Function and Loss of Barrier. 
Local effect comment: Displays detailed description of consequence for each respective Local 
Effect and must include a concise description of the effect(s) of the failure mode to 
explain/justify the “Local Effect” 
Hidden: Displays whether the respective Failure Mode (function) is defined as hidden or not, 
and is defined in the Decision Tree, displayed as Yes or No. 
Frequency standard (qualitative MTTF): Displays the expected MTTF for each respective Failure 
Mode based on failure data standards such as OREDA and PDS Data Handbook. The Frequency 
standard qualitative data field gives traceability to recognized failure data sources and gives 
guidance to MTTF value in the Frequency OAI field. 
Project Code: This field is used to activate/deactivate each respective failure mode where 
relevant. 
Deactivating Failure Modes may be relevant if the Object for the failure Mode is not applicable 
for the client, or if Failure Mode is found not to be applicable through analysis for the project. 
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7.2 Calculation of OREDA Data 
7.2.1 Assumptions 
Constant failure rate: OREDA base the failure modes on random failure rate pattern since the 
input come from the equipment’s useful life phase. 
Failure rate a sum of severities: OREDA classify the failure modes based on severity; Critical, 
degraded, incipient and unknown.  
The failure mode severity Unknown is not taken into account because of its uncertainty and the 
fact that it is not used to a great extent. 
In my experience from reading other consultants FMECAs with MTTF based on OREDA, only the 
critical severity is taken into consideration. This may be the case since that methodology would 
be correct for a reliability analysis where the downtime is essential.  
Take the oil filter on a car as an example: How often do you experience mechanical problems 
on your engine as a result of bad oil quality? Almost never. Why? Because the filter and 
subsequently the oil is changed at regular intervals at incipient or degraded state. But the small 
amount of registered critical failures does not mean the filter/oil should not be changed or set 
to an interval for change based on MTTF from Critical failure mode only. 
The assumption is based on that the failure mechanism in many cases grows from low severity 
to critical severity and therefor the failure rate should include the input from all phases. 
Additionally it is assumed that the amount of failures, n, is recorded for the equipment type at 
the same period of time. So the total failures ntotal will be 𝑛𝐼 + 𝑛𝐷 + 𝑛𝐶 . Of course it can be 
argued that a failure is when the equipment does not deliver its intended function as described 
in section 2.2.1. I can agree that the incipient failure (which I interpret as the last stage in the 
margin of deterioration) cannot be called a failure. But since you want to detect the failure 
before the failure is experienced and thus have time to plan a condition based corrective work 
order, I choose to take the incipient failure mode into consideration. 
Usage of upper failure rate to determine MTTF:  To determine the optimal interval from 
maintenance activities the failure rate without maintenance should be determined. The data 
gathered in OREDA represent failures happened with maintenance and has a mean, lower and 
upper value of the failure rate to account for the uncertainty of the failure rate. 
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The assumption defines lower as the best in the class, mean as the average and upper as the 
worst in the class. Additionally the assumption is made that upper will be similar to no 
maintenance performed. 
This is a coarse assumption and may be overkill. Nonetheless it is better to calculate with a 
lower MTTF in the initial PM-program and optimize with maintenance data from operation to 
uphold the safety. 
However, if the standard deviation is great (above 20) the mean values can be used. This is due 
to the great sensitivity in the upper value experience from abnormal reporting.  
Obtaining MTTF in years: The failure rate is given in Calendar and Operational time. Calendar 
time is used since it is stated it the most accurate in the OREDA Handbook. The failure rate in 
OREDA is based on failure per 106 hours. 
The assumption states that the maximum amount of hours (24hours*365days) possible in a 
calendar year should be used to change the MTTF from hours to years.  
7.2.2 Methodology 
Selecting Failure modes 
 Based on Activity regulation §46, only severe failures need to be taken into consideration. This 
means that failure modes (if any) with no critical severity should not be taken into 
consideration. Thus the performer shall start with a critical severity and then look for degraded 
and incipient severity  
Formulas 
The formula for determine Mean Time to Failure is: MTTF = 1
𝜆
 
 
The total failure rate is determined by: λ = 
𝑛𝐼+𝑛𝐷+𝑛𝐶
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 (106) 
nI – Number of Incipient failures 
nD – Number of Degraded failures 
nC – Number of Critical failures 
 
Calculating failure rate from hours to years: λ = 
𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
106ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠∗
1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
8760 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
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To determine the severity of the failure rate three additional columns should be included in the 
FMEA sheet when using failure data from OREDA. These columns will show the percentage of 
each severity representing in the failure rate. This is done to more easily determine is the 
failure mode is hidden and subsequently determine the maintenance type to prevent the 
failure mechanism. For example a failure rate with 100% critical failure can have a replacement 
at certain intervals or function test, while failure modes with growing detectable failure 
mechanisms (20% Critical, 40% degraded, 40% incipient) can have condition monitoring or 
routine check with subsequent maintenance activities. 
This is calculated by dividing each severity failures with the total failures: %Critical =
𝑛𝐶
𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
Determining the maintenance item (object) 
A Failure mode has several maintenance items contributing to the failure rate. To focus the 
maintenance activities to the right maintenance items the failure modes versus maintenance 
item (shown in table 5.2.3) must be consulted. Items representing a different equipment type 
and thus a different Generic Maintenance Concept shall not be included. As shown in table 
5.2.3 is the failure mode versus failure item of a centrifugal pump. Two maintenance item sticks 
out; valve and instrument flow. These will be represented in their own GMC to not create 
several redundant failure modes with different failure rates. 
Additionally only the maintenance items contributing most to a failure mode should be 
considered. This is done to focus the analysis where it is most valuable. I use ELU (external 
leakage utility) as an example. Piping and seals has a relative contribution of 17.04 out of 17.34, 
thus 98,2% for the failure rate. Thus the 0,08% contribution from the casing is not relevant 
enough to take into consideration. 
To find the maintenance items failure rate the percentage they contribute with must be 
calculated and the multiplied with the total failure rate 
%Seal=13.66
17,34=0,79        λ seal= λ total*0.79 
Determining the failure mechanism 
To determine the failure mechanism, the Failure mode versus Failure mechanism (shown in 
table 5.2.4) must be consulted. Finding the right failure mechanism for each item is based on 
engineering judgment and can be difficult without practical knowledge. As a starting point the 
table show which failure mechanisms contributes most. The most evident failure mechanism 
should be used in the drop-down box, subsequently the failure mechanism note field can be 
used to explain other contributing factors. 
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7.2.3 Calculation Examples of different methods 
Manual Valve, general (OREDA Taxonomy no 4.4): 
 
External Leakage-Process Medium (ELP), Critical Failure mode and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 0,36
106
8760
)=317 Years 
External Leakage-Process Medium (ELP), sum of severities and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1(0,36+1,57+0,42
106
8760
)=48 Years 
External Leakage-Process Medium (ELP), sum of severities and upper failure rate 
MTTF=
1(1,88+6,39+2,07
106
8760
)=11 Years 
Pump, centrifugal (high standard deviation) (OREDA Taxonomy no 1.3.1) 
External leakage utility medium (ELU), Critical Failure mode and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 5,35
106
8760
)=21 Years 
External leakage utility medium (ELU), sum of severities and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1(5,35+22,45+4,25
106
8760
)=3,6 Years 
External leakage utility medium (ELU), sum of severities and upper failure rate 
MTTF=
1(14,77+103,84+17,92
106
8760
)=0,8 Years 
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Electric motor, general (Only critical severity recorded) (OREDA Taxonomy no 2.2): 
 
Overheating (OHE), Critical Failure mode and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 0,75
106
8760
)=152 Years 
Overheating (OHE), sum of severities and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 0,75
106
8760
)=152 Years 
Overheating (OHE), sum of severities and upper failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 2,61
106
8760
)=44 Years 
Compressor Reciprocating (No incipient severity) (OREDA Taxonomy no 1.1.2): 
 
Fail to stop on demand (STP), Critical Failure mode and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1( 4,52
106
8760
)=25 Years 
Fail to stop on demand (STP), sum of severities and mean failure rate 
MTTF=
1(4,52+2,83
106
8760
)=15,5 Years 
Fail to stop on demand (STP), sum of severities and upper failure rate 
MTTF=
1(19,93+7,47
106
8760
)=4,2 Years 
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7.2.4 Comparing Calculations with reference data 
 
Equipment Failure modes Critical Failure 
mode and 
mean failure 
rate (MTTF 
Years) 
Sum of 
severities and 
mean failure 
rate (MTTF 
Years) 
Sum of 
severities and 
upper failure 
rate (MTTF 
Years) 
Reference 
(MTTF Years) 
Manual 
Valve, 
general 
External 
Leakage-
Process 
Medium (ELP), 
317 48 11 2-5 
Pump, 
centrifugal 
External 
leakage utility 
medium (ELU), 
21 3,6 0,8 5-10 
Electric 
motor, 
general 
Overheating 
(OHE) 
152 152 44 10-20 
Compressor 
Reciprocating 
Fail to stop on 
demand (STP), 
25 15 4,2 5-10 
Table 7.2.1 – Calculations versus reference data 
 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
The input from OREDA varies but the four examples cover the different scenarios detected 
when performing calculations. Based on the examples a combination of mean and upper values 
be based on the standard deviation should be used to calculate the MTTF.  However under in all 
circumstances the sum of all severities gives a better result that only using critical severity. 
The reference data is limited due to the reluctance of vendors to give FMEAs of their 
equipment. 
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7.3 Achieving RCM compliance 
With the failure mode module OAI can perform FMEAs on installation equipment. An example 
is shown in table 7.3.1 where an FMEA worksheet from IEC 60812 is used as a basis. 
 
Figure 7.3.1[52] - Example of the format of an FMEA Worksheet  
Item identification and function is performed by linking a tag to a sub function and a Generic 
Maintenance Concept. 
Failure Modes, causes, mechanisms and MTTF is covered by the Failure Mode Module. A 
tag is given these failure modes when linked to the GMC containing the failure modes. 
Local and final effect is covered by the Consequence Classification and assigned the tag when 
linked to a sub function. However, if the failure mode is an unsafe failure the local effect will be 
taken from the failure mode module. (Example earth fault in an electric motor) 
Detection method and compensating provision against failure is determined in the 
Decision Tree Logic and subsequently by the maintenance activities in the GMC. 
Severity Class is determined in the Consequence classification and assigned; high, medium or 
low.  
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8 Results 
A work process for how to add failure modes to the OIA Generic Maintenance Concepts has 
been established. The Failure Mode Module has been developed with functionality to be 
aligned with this new work process and is implemented into Kamfer 7. Failure Modes from 
OREDA-2009 based on input and assumptions made in Chapter 7 has in turn been implemented 
in the Generic Maintenance Concepts by use of the newly developed Failure Mode Module. It is 
now possible to document the process of identifying failure modes and establishment of 
maintenance concepts with the improvements implemented in Kamfer 7. Any client can 
document the decisions and analysis that led to the chosen maintenance strategy for each 
equipment, and show traceability all the way from identification of failure modes to the CMMS 
and Work Order History. 
In addition, any clients historical data can be used at a later stage to optimize the maintenance 
program as described in chapter 7.4. 
 
Figure 8.1[53]  - Maintenance concept with Failure mode  
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9 Recommendations 
For further utilization of the failure mode module a FMECA report should the created in Kamfer 
7.  This will create possibilities to supply a customer with a full FMECA of all equipment in the 
Kamfer database which can be delivered as an addition to the Generic Maintenance Concept 
and Consequence Classification reports and may lead to a better understanding of the 
deliverables. 
Additionally the Online Portal should be developed to receive input from maintenance reports. 
Today the Online Portal has feedback possibilities which the developers can build on. 
Meanwhile Oceaneering Asset Integrity should develop a methodology for performing 
optimisation of maintenance intervals and methods. Subsequently an optimization module 
should be developed in Kamfer 7 to perform the calculations.  
The calculations could be based on the formula OREDA use for weighting one data source 
against another: 
λestimated=
λ𝑎2+λ𝑏
2�
λ𝑎
λ𝑏
+
�λ𝑎−λ𝑏�
𝑆𝐷𝑏
�
2
λ𝑎+λ𝑏�
λ𝑎
λ𝑏
+
�λ𝑎−λ𝑏�
𝑆𝐷𝑏
�
2  λa=original failure rate,  λb=new failure rate 
Adding maintenance optimisation to the service portfolio will enable OAI to perform services in 
all the aspects of the Maintenance Management Loop. 
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Appendix A Establishment of Technical hierarchy 
NORSOK Z-008[53]  
The level of detail with regards to tagging is in many ways a deciding factor to ensure that the 
equipment will receive the adequate maintenance. On the Norwegian Continental Shelf there is 
an industrial heritage of tagging to a detailed level where even instrumentation and equipment 
in support of MFs and sub functions are tagged The tagging is to be consistent from drawings, 
the actual equipment in the installation and the CMMS and is an important part of 
documenting the equipment through its life cycle. 
Figure A.1 illustrates the workflow to establish a technical hierarchy 
 
Figure A.1 – Work process technical hierarchy 
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To establish a technical hierarchy it is necessary with a set of technical drawings, e.g. flow and 
one-line diagrams, P&IDs etc. and a list of tags and a tool for linking tags to each other. 
The top of the technical hierarchy normally starts with the installation code with the system 
numbers listed in Figure D.2. The usage of system numbers may vary from plant to plant 
NORSOK Z-DP-002 uses system numbers between 00 and 99. Other standards like SFI [Ship 
research institute of Norway (Skipsteknisk Forskningsinstitutt)] would have a 3 digit numbers as 
system numbering, but the principles may be similar.  
 
Technical drawings can be used to identify 
skids, packages and main equipment that 
can work as a superior tag for the 
connected instruments, valves and other 
kinds of equipment. There can be several 
levels beneath a level, e.g. a skid that 
contains 2 pumps with electric motors. The 
skid will then be the top level, the pumps 
will be the 2nd level, and the electric 
motors will be the 3rd level to the 
corresponding pump. Each level can hold 
corresponding instruments and valves. See 
Figure A.2.  
Figure A.2- Technical hierarchy
 
Start with a system by identifying skids and main equipment. Then link all the skids and main 
equipment that will be used as a superior tag to the system number in the tree structure. Next 
step is to identify the instruments, valves and other kinds of equipment on the system and 
connect them to the corresponding skid or main equipment. If there are no skids or main 
equipment, but only e.g. instruments or valves, then administrative tags should be established 
to form the level above. The instruments, valves and other kinds of equipment are then linked 
to the administrative tags. In instrument loops one of the components can represent the whole 
loop e.g. a transmitter or valve, while the rest of the loop lie beneath.  
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Appendix B Consequence classification NORSOK Z-008 
B.1 Main function description and boundaries[55]  
Descriptions of MFs should aim to describe an active function (i.e. ‟Pumping„ instead of 
‟Pump„). Descriptions commonly used for MFs are shown in Table B.1. Normally a further 
specification is required to describe the MF sufficiently. If relevant, the availability, capacity and 
performance should be specified. 
 
Table B.1 – Examples of Main Function descriptions 
Examples displaying the MF HF2020 (along with others) with boundaries marked on a flow 
diagram, and the same MF with boundaries marked on the more detailed P&ID is shown on 
Figure B.1 and B.2 
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Figure B.1 - – Flow diagram showing borderlines between MFs (HF2017, HF2020) 
 
Figure B.2 – P&ID showing borderlines for MF HF2020 
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B.2 Simplifying consequence assessment of standard sub 
functions [56]  
The consequence assessment of the MF already performed may be used as a basis for 
establishing the consequence assessment for the standard sub functions. It is recommended 
that these evaluations are verified by experienced process personnel and adjusted individually, 
if needed. 
An example of guidelines for the standardized sub functions for one project is shown in Table 
B.1. 
NOTE – ‟Other functions„ have to be assessed independently. 
 
Table B.2 - Project guideline example of consequence assessment of standardized 
sub functions, based on the MF consequence assessment 
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B.3 Risk matrix and redundancy definition 
 
Table B.2 [57]  - Example of risk matrix used for consequence classification and for 
decisions  
 
Table B.3 [58 ] - Example of redundancy definitions  
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APENDIX C Generic Maintenance Concept (GMC)  
 
 
Figure C.1 [59]  – NORSOKZz-008 Example of Generic Maintenance Concept 
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Appendix D – Failure Mode, Cause and Mechanism tables 
D.2 Failure Modes 
Failure Mode Code Failure Mode Description Examples 
AIR 
Abnormal instrument 
reading False alarm, faulty instrument indication 
BRD Breakdown Serious damage (seizure, breakage) 
DEX Defect EX barrier Defect EX barrier 
ELP 
External leakage - Process 
medium Oil, gas, condensate, water 
ELU 
External leakage - Utility 
medium Lubricant, cooling water 
ERO Erratic output Oscillating, hunting, instability 
FCO Failure to connect Failure to connect 
FDC Failure to disconnect Failure to disconnect when demanded 
FOF Faulty output frequency Wrong/oscilliating frequency 
FOV Faulty output voltage Wrong/unstable output voltage 
FRO Failure to rotate Failure to rotate 
FTC Failure to close on demand Doesn't close on demand 
FTF 
Failure to function on 
demand Doesn't start on demand 
FTI 
Failure to function as 
intended General operation failure 
FTL Failure to lock/unlock Doesn't lock or unlock when demanded 
FTO Failure to open on demand 
Failure to respond on signal/activation. Doesn't 
open on demand. 
FTR Failure to regulate Failure to respond on signal/activation. 
FTS Failure to start on demand Doesn't start on demand 
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance 
IHT Insufficient heat transfer Cooling/heating below acceptance 
INL Internal leakage Leakage internally of process or utility fluids 
LBB Loss of buoyancy 
Loss of buoyancy in idle position (Code LOB in 
ISO14224) 
LBP Low oil supply pressure Low oil supply pressure 
LCP Leakage in closed position Leak through valve in closed position 
LOA Load drop Load drop 
LOB Loss of barrier One or more barriers against oil/gas escape lost 
LOO Low output 
Delivery/output below acceptance. Performance 
below specifications. 
LOP Loss of performance Loss of performance 
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LOR Loss of redundancy 
One or more redundant units not functioning (e.g. 
main/backup control system, runs on backup 
server). 
MOF Mooring failure Mooring failure 
NOI Noise Abnormal/excessive noise 
NON No immediate effect No effect on function 
NOO No output No output 
OHE Overheating 
Overheating of machine parts, exhaust, cooling 
water 
OTH Other Failure modes not covered in list 
PDE Parameter deviation 
Monitored parameter exceeding limits, e.g. 
high/low alarm 
PLU Plugged / Choked 
Partial or full flow restriction due to 
contamination, objects, wax, etc. 
POD 
Loss of function on both 
PODs Both pods (on BOP) are not functioning as desired 
POW Insufficient power Lack of or too low power supply 
PTF 
Power/signal transmission 
failure Power/signal transmission failure 
SER Minor in-service problems Loose items, discoloration, dirt 
SET Failure to set/retreive Failed set/retreive operations 
SHH Spurious high alarm level 
e.g. 60% of Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) on fire/gas 
detectors 
SLL Spurious low alarm level 
e.g. 20% of Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) on fire/gas 
detectors 
SLP Slippage Wire slippage 
SPO Spurious operation 
Unexpected operation, fails to operate as 
demanded, (false alarm) 
SPS Spurious stop Unexpected stop, fails to operate as intended 
STD Structural deficiency 
Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, 
corrosion, rupture) 
STP Failure to stop on demand Doesn't stop on demand 
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode 
UST Spurious stop Unexpected shutdown 
VIB Vibration Abnormal vibration 
VLO Very low output 
e.g. reading between 11% Lower Explosion Limit 
(LEL) to 30% LEL upon gas test 
Table D.1 [6 0 ] – Failure Modes 
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D.2 Failure Causes 
Failure Cause 
Mechanical fracture 
Axle fracture 
Bearing fracture / fault 
Mechanical damage / fault 
Mechanical breakdown 
Rupture / Crack 
Loose fasteners / bolts 
Defect spring 
Defect clutch 
Stuck in one position 
Internal lekage 
Leaking past piston 
Faulty sealing/ membrane 
Faulty pilot/ control system 
Blocked / clogged 
Undesired pressure build-up 
Cavitation 
Scaling 
Wire/connection fracture/ 
fault 
Faulty controller (internal) 
Short circuit 
Faulty component 
Faulty circuit board 
Erratic calibration 
Set-point deviation 
Magnetic conditions 
Table D.2 [6 1 ]  – Recommended failure causes  
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D.3 Failure Mechanisms 
 
Table D.3 [6 2 ] – Failure Mechanisms  
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Table D.3 – (continued)  
 
